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THE DETERMINANTS OF SHIRKING:








In the efficiency wage model, unemployment is a worker discipline device [Shapiro
and Stiglitz 1984]. Firms have an incentive to pay an efficiency wage that yields an
unemployment rate above equilibrium. Because there is a real cost to losing one’s job
and entering the pool of unemployed workers, individuals have an incentive to work
on the job rather than to shirk. In the absence of unemployment, there is no market
penalty for being fired. When effort is modeled as an all or nothing choice, no one
shirks in equilibrium. To remove the all or nothing restriction, Bowles [1985] recog-
nizes the marginal trade-off created by costly monitoring of workers. When the effi-
ciency wage model is extended to permit a continuous level of effort, the individual
worker makes a marginal decision as to the extent of shirking appropriate for a given
job. The more an individual shirks the greater the risk of being fired. To measure this
component of worker behavior empirically, one can turn to the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate captures the search behavior of job losers, as well as new
entrants or reentrants to the labor force. The behavior of these unemployed groups
can display significant differences. This paper extends the Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984]
model to include an analysis of equilibrium job loss from shirking and empirically
tests for the relationship between labor market conditions and job loss. This process
identifies empirical differences between job losers and other unemployed members of
the labor force.
The equilibrium level of job loser unemployment is shown to fluctuate given the
degree to which firms monitor shirking over the business cycle. While this extension
does not change the core results of the efficiency wage model, it does provide some
additional insights. For example, in equilibrium, everyone shirks some. Consequently,
on the job leisure is a form of employee benefit that is regulated by the extent to
which the firm monitors, reprimands, and fires shirkers. Across the business cycle8 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
the firm’s shadow price of turnover changes, and hence does the equilibrium level of
job losers.
In the first section of the paper the Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984] model of unemploy-
ment is extended to include a representation of equilibrium in which workers may
choose to shirk. The firm’s monitoring problem is modeled with the tolerance of shirking
subject to its cost as determined by market forces. The firm therefore views the degree
of shirking as a form of compensation like other employee perks. The model pre-
sented provides a microfoundation for the job loser portion of unemployment.
The model addresses the following concerns: does equilibrium unemployment for
job losers differ from that of other unemployed workers?  If indeed there are differ-
ences, can they be explained by the theoretical model?  In the third section, the empiri-
cal implications from the microfoundations are discussed. After the methodology is
reviewed, an empirical model is developed to analyze the behavior of job loser unem-
ployment rates at the state level. The state-level data permit an analysis of the corre-
lation of unemployment rate components with productivity and GSP. Then, the state-
level data is used to estimate the Phillip’s Curve relationship. These estimations are
performed using annual data from 1986 through 1994, for a panel of the 48 contiguous
states. The final section concludes the analysis.
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The equilibrium level of shirking will depend on individual preferences, including
risk preferences. Since firms may choose to tolerate shirking as a form of employee
compensation, levels of shirking differ among firms. The resulting level of shirking
can therefore be viewed either as the consumer equilibrium for the worker facing
income constraints associated with potential job loss, or as the firm’s employment
decision subject to labor supply constraints. Both formulations are developed.1 Over
time, the equilibrium level of shirking within the economy may increase or decrease
along with easily measured economic variables, such as unemployment rates and
wages.
Microfoundations of Shirking
Consider the individual with a utility function U(xt, γt), who, at any time period t,
consumes goods xt with price pt and a rate of on the job leisure γt, where 0 ≤ γt ≤ 1. The
individual’s consumption decision is subject to a budget constraint, represented by
Equation (1):
(1) ptxt = wt(1 – βt – γtqt) + bt(βt + γtqt) .
Here wages are represented by wt. The probability of working is 0 ≤ (1 – βt – γtqt) ≤ 1.
The unemployed individual receives benefits bt. The probability of unemployment is
0 ≤ (βt + γtqt) ≤ 1. The probability of being caught shirking is the product of the probabil-
ity of being monitored, qt, times the probability that the worker is shirking, γt. The
probability of losing work for other reasons is captured by βt. This choice is made and
discounted over the individual’s lifetime Ω. The individual maximizes lifetime utility,
V1 given by Equation (2), subject to the budget constraint, given by Equation (1).9 THE DETERMINANTS OF SHIRKING
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An interior solution to the optimization problem is assumed. The shadow price on the
individual’s budget constraint will be represented by λt1. Finding the usual first-order
conditions and solving, in equilibrium:
(3) ∂∂ () ∂∂ () =− () UU x q w b p tt t t t t γ .
FIGURE 1
The marginal cost of shirking is just the probability of getting caught times the
wages lost from a period of unemployment. The consumer equilibrium, as displayed in
Figure 1, requires that the ratio of the marginal cost of shirking, qt(wt – bt), relative to
the price of the consumption good, pt, is equal to the ratio of the marginal benefit of
shirking relative to the marginal benefit of the consumption good. The utility analysis
of the worker implies a demand for on-the-job leisure.
Microfoundations of Firm Monitoring Cost
In equilibrium, the extent to which a worker chooses to consume on-the-job leisure
through shirking depends on the probability of being monitored. This raises the ques-
tion, why might the extent of monitoring workers differ among firms?
Firms that hire workers in a competitive labor market will not face equal turn-
over costs if they differ in their production processes. If labor is specialized or firm-
specific training costs are high, then the firm will adopt strategies to minimize turn-
over. Pencavel [1972] finds that firms that provide on-the-job training also offer higher
wages to reduce voluntary turnover. Parker and Rhine [1991] develop a model in
which nonwage compensation is manipulated to attract stable workers and reduce
quits. Again, the level of turnover depends not just on the level of total compensation,
but also the compensation mix. Dye and Antle [1984] show that workers with hetero-
geneous preferences do self-select into firms based on the compensation mix offered.
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Part of the compensation mix could be viewed as the tolerance of shirking. Following
this line of reasoning, a monitoring system that allows some shirking is just a non-
monetary benefit that may be used to reduce costly turnover.
Let the firm’s production function be represented by f(Nt
*), f '(Nt
*) > 0, f ''(Nt
*) < 0,
where Nt
* represents the actual labor effort of the work force. It can be represented by
the number of workers reduced by the degree of shirking, Nt
* = (1– γt
*)Nt. Output is
sold at price Pt. Thus total revenue is Ptf(Nt
*) and the value of the marginal product of
effective labor, Nt
*, is ∂U/∂Nt
* = Ptf '(Nt
*). The value of the marginal product of another
worker, Nt, is ∂U/∂Nt = (1 – γt
*)Ptf '(Nt
*). The value of the marginal impact on productiv-
ity from changing the allowed shirking rate is ∂U/∂γt
* = – Nt Ptf '(Nt
*).
Workers will be fired if they are caught shirking more than allowed by the firm.
This implies some type of monitoring operation by the firm to identify those workers
who exceed the expected level of shirking. Monitoring costs are assumed to be propor-
tional to the size of the labor force, θtNt. The number of people fired for shirking will
be a function of the shirking beyond that allowed and the wage paid. The rate of
workers fired is then Q(γt
*), Q' > 0. New hires are a function of wages and the working
conditions, such as the level of shirking permitted. The functional relation L(Wt, γt
*) is
quasi-concave, with L1 > 0, L2 > 0, L11 < 0, and L22 < 0. The change in the workforce,
shown in Equation (4), is given by the difference between the number of workers who
are hired, L(Wt, γt
*); who are fired, Qt; and who lose their job for other reasons, βt. (The
rate of workers losing their jobs for other reasons, βt, is the same as represented in
the worker model of the previous section.)
(4) ˙ ,; . * NL W NQ N L tt tt tt = () −− ≥ γβ 0
Turnover is costly, particularly when the firm’s production process requires spe-
cific training. Hiring and training costs are increasing in the number of accessions,
sg(L(Wt, γt
*)), g' > 0, g'' < 0. The coefficient, s, is the ratio of specific to general training
and is assumed constant. Turnover costs increase as s increases. Given a wage Wt and
monitoring costs of the labor force θt, profit is defined as
(5) PN W N N sL W t t tt tt tt fg ** ,. () −− − () () θγ
The compensation package, Wt and γt
*, is selected by the firm to maximize profits, V2
given in Equation (6), discounted at a rate R, subject to the change in the work force,
given by Equation (4), and some initial condition on employment, say, N(0) = N0.
(6) VP N W N N s L W e d t t t tt tt tt
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The variable λt2 is used to represent the costate variable that is interpreted as the
shadow price associated with labor force adjustments. In addition to the equation of
motion and boundary conditions, an interior solution to the optimization problem is
assumed, and optimization includes the equations:
(7) λt2 L1 = Nt  + sg'L1 ,11 THE DETERMINANTS OF SHIRKING
(8) λt2 (L2 – Q'Nt) = NtPtf '(Nt
*) + sg'L2 , and
(9) (1– γt
*)Ptf '(Nt
*) + λ't2 = Wt + θt + λt2(βt + Qt + R) ,
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Equations (7) and (8) provide an interpretation of the necessary conditions for
selecting the optimal values for the control variables. Increasing either type of com-
pensation yields marginal gains through attracting new hires as measured through L1
and L2. When the permitted shirking is increased, fewer people are fired and there are
marginal gains from the reduced turnover costs, Q'. Equations (7) and (8) each demon-
strate that the marginal benefits will equal the marginal cost for each element of the
compensation package. Solving Equations (7) and (8), the firm will minimize costs
where
(11) (Nt  + sg'L1)/(NtPtf '(Nt
*) + sg'L2) = L1 /(L2 – Q'Nt).
Equation (9) is the equilibrium condition for the costate variable, λt2, with the addi-
tional condition that the flow equilibrium is equal to zero. The variable λt2 is the
shadow price associated with labor force adjustments. The term λ't2 is the derivative of
λt2 with respect to Nt. This is interpreted as the rate of change in the shadow price of
an additional worker. Equation (9) states that the value of the marginal product of
workers, Ptf '(Nt
*), plus the change in the shadow price of an additional worker, λ't2,
will equal total compensation to the worker, Wt, plus the cost of shirking, γt
*Pt f '(Nt
*);
monitoring costs, θt; and the turnover costs associated with hiring, firing, and train-
ing, λt2(βt + Qt + R).
FIGURE 2
A graphical representation that illustrates the importance of specific training
costs is given in Figure 2, with the slopes as indicated in Equation (11). The distribu-
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microfoundations of diminishing marginal utility with respect to either form of com-
pensation. The firm’s training costs provide the concave curve. A firm with training
costs such that (Nt  + sg'L1)/(NtPtf '(Nt
*) + sg'L2) > 1/ Ptf '(Nt
*) will allow a greater degree
of shirking than a firm with no specific training costs.
Workers face the cost-benefit analysis of consuming on-the-job leisure based upon
the probability of being caught and fired by their particular employer. The model of
firm monitoring costs demonstrates that different firms will choose different strate-
gies for tolerating this shirking behavior based upon firm-specific turnover costs. The
firm’s compensation structure yields a marginal cost (supply) of permitting shirking
within the work environment. The job loser unemployment rate is the aggregate job
loss from the various firm-worker interactions across the economy. Job loss beyond
that attributed to other economic conditions, βt, reflects changes in shirking equilib-
rium or the supply of on-the-job leisure.
EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS FROM THE MICROFOUNDATIONS
The implications of this exercise go beyond a demonstration that all workers who
value on-the-job leisure shirk some and all firms tolerate some degree of shirking.
Now that the microfoundations have been established to allow a continuous level of
shirking, the model indicates that the opportunity cost of shirking for both workers
and firms is dependent on economic variables. The utility analysis of the worker implies
a demand for on-the-job leisure. Similarly, the analysis of the firm’s compensation
structure yields a marginal cost (supply) of permitting shirking within the work environ-
ment. The extent of shirking, therefore, shifts with economic conditions that impact
the firm or the worker. The firm’s marginal cost of shirking is determined by turn-
over costs. These costs differ by sector and occupation. The mix of industry employ-
ment and education of the work force will reflect these turnover costs. This frame-
work provides the potential to measure and track changes in worker effort.
The objective is to support this model and its implications empirically. Does evi-
dence support the notion that when job loser unemployment rates are low the oppor-
tunity cost of shirking is reduced? Does the tolerance of shirking substitute for wage
compensation? Does the generosity of unemployment insurance impact the decision
to shirk?
These questions are addressed using annual data from 1986 through 1994 for a
panel of the 48 contiguous states. A series of simultaneous equations are estimated to
address the impact of shirking on state productivity, Gross State Product (GSP) growth,
and wage inflation. As a proxy for the probability of job loss (either from economic
conditions or from being caught shirking), βt + γtqt, job loser data from the Department
of Labor is used.2 The number of job losers is divided by the labor force to estimate a
“job loser” unemployment rate. Job loss due to shirking will certainly be a component
of this rate as well as other factors, such as plant closures and bankruptcies. To the
extent that job loss due to firings is a significant source of the dynamics of this rate,
then an analysis of its dynamics provides a useful contribution to our understanding of
equilibrium shirking. The residual unemployed is categorized as the “adjusted” unem-
ployment rate. Adjusted unemployment acts as an instrument for the probability of
being unemployed for other reasons, βt from Equation (1). Adjusted unemployment13 THE DETERMINANTS OF SHIRKING
includes job leavers, temporary layoffs, reentrants, and new entrants. The sum of “job
losers” and “adjusted” unemployment rates is the total unemployment rate.3
METHODOLOGY
The first set of estimations considers GSP growth and employment growth. Since
productivity is measured by GSP divided by employment, the growth rate of produc-
tivity is the growth rate of GSP minus the growth rate of employment. A direct esti-
mation of the impact of shirking on productivity is therefore hampered by the specifi-
cation of the relationship among productivity growth, GSP growth, and employment
growth. Instead, employment growth and GSP growth are estimated. A two-stage
least squares estimation is specified to capture the link from job loser unemployment
and each of these measures. The econometric approach follows Pantuosco, Parker,
and Stone [2001].
The next two pairs of equations estimate the classic Phillips relation as a pair of
simultaneous equations using the approach of Hyclak and Johnes [1992]. First, the job
loser unemployment rate is estimated in conjunction with wage inflation. In the last
estimation, the adjusted unemployment rate is simultaneously estimated with wage
inflation. This provides alternate instruments for the impact of the unemployment
equation on wage inflation. The pairs of equations were preselected because of their
theoretical and empirical endogeneity. The use of a system of simultaneous equations
controls for multicollinearity and is a preferred method for testing in the presence of
heteroscedasticity. The simultaneous equations technique is estimated using a three-
stage least squares estimation with instrumental variables.
Econometric concerns, such as multicollinearity, autocorrelation, and
heteroscedasticity, exist when conducting a panel study. Single-equation unadjusted
estimation techniques exaggerate these problems. In this paper several steps have
been taken to address each issue. Using rates of change mitigates heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation. Incorporating lagged variables is a control for autocorrelation
and provides a test for persistence.
PRODUCT MARKET EFFECTS
The following pair of equations addresses the determination of employment growth
and GSP growth.
(12) EMP = b0 + b1*JLUR–1 + b2*ADJUSTEDUR–1 + b3*GSP + b4* WAGINF + e ,
(13) GSP= a0 + a1* JLUR–1 + a2*ADJUSTEDUR–1 + a3*GSP–1 +
a4*CHPOP + a5*EMP + e ,
where EMP is the employment growth rate; GSP is the growth rate of the GSP;
JLUR is the unemployment rate of job losers;4 ADJUSTEDUR is the adjusted unem-
ployment rate, which is the residual after job losers are subtracted from the total
unemployed; WAGINF is wage inflation; and CHPOP is the change in population. All
data are annual at the state level.14 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
The extended Shapiro-Stiglitz model presented in the previous section communi-
cates the relationship between productivity, employment, and the job loser unemploy-
ment rate due to shirking. Companies that closely monitor shirking fire shirkers.
When GSP and other economic conditions are controlled for, an aggressive monitor-
ing system is evidenced by an increase in the unemployment rate of job losers. Here
the productivity gains are achieved through reduced employment. When the unem-
ployment rate for job losers is high, employment growth is low. The job loser unem-
ployment rate will be negatively correlated with employment growth.
The relationship between employment growth and adjusted unemployment is depen-
dent on the reason for unemployment. For example, reentrants and new entrants
may be responding to the same economic signals that permit an employed worker to
consume more on-the-job leisure. However, workers who become voluntarily unem-
ployed may be more productive employees who are searching for a better opportunity
or greater compensation for their efforts. Workers who shirk may be less likely to
leave their jobs. For this reason, there are ambiguous indicators of the relationship
between adjusted unemployment and employment growth.
The efficiency wage theory states that employers pay above-market wages to encour-
age greater productivity and less turnover [Katz, 1986]. Some union literature claims
that the above-market wages obtained by unions increase worker productivity [Freeman
and Medoff, 1984; and Belman, 1992]. Hirsch [1997] suggests the possibility of a shock
effect, in which management in high-paying firms is forced to organize, reducing employ-
ment and producing more efficiently to survive. In each framework, the correlation
between wage inflation and employment growth is negative.
Consider the relationship between the job loser unemployment rate and GSP
growth. Increases in the job loser unemployment rate represent an equilibrium reduc-
tion in shirking while decreases in this rate indicate that companies are permitting
greater consumption of on-the-job leisure without penalty. If, as indicated in the model,
shirking is a form of employee compensation, then decreases in job loser unemploy-
ment are an efficient response to labor markets. Consequently, a negative relation-
ship between the job loser unemployment rate and GSP growth would support the
claim that permitting shirking is an efficient adjustment of labor market equilibrium.
Search unemployment, new entrants, and reentrants into the labor force tend to
rise with the business cycle [Eberts and Stone, 1992], while temporary layoffs are
countercyclical. If the coefficient on adjusted unemployment, a2, is positive, there is
evidence to support the claim that the variation in adjusted unemployment stems
from cyclical components. A negative coefficient could indicate fluctuations in layoffs.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 show the results from the estimation of the simulta-
neous Equations (12) and (13). The separation of the unemployment rate into compo-
nent parts of job losers and adjusted unemployed reveals some statistically significant
differences.
The clearest difference is in the GSP equation. The job loser unemployment rate
is negatively correlated with GSP, while increases in other types of unemployment
are positively correlated with GSP. This dynamic is consistent with the shirking model
presented earlier. Reductions in the monitoring of work effort reduce the number of
workers fired, and the job loser unemployment rate decreases. Firms engage in this15 THE DETERMINANTS OF SHIRKING
behavior as an efficient form of compensation that serves to enhance economic growth.
The adjusted unemployment rate is capturing the cyclical incentives to engage in
search. Employment growth has a positive significant impact on GSP while population




















Absolute t-statistics in parentheses.
N = 432.
*     Significant at .01.
**   Significant at .05.
*** Significant at .10.
The job loser unemployment rate is negatively and significantly correlated with
employment growth. Again there are statistically different coefficients for the job
loser unemployment rate and the adjusted unemployment rate. As expected, wage
inflation is negatively and significantly correlated with employment growth. The coef-
ficient for GSP on employment growth is positive and significant. When economic
growth occurs, jobs are created.
In summary, the empirical results indicate that the job loser unemployment rate
does behave like an efficient form of employee compensation in equilibrium. The job
loser unemployment rate is negatively correlated with employment growth and GSP.
This is consistent with the argument that efficient reductions in job loser unemploy-
ment as shirking is permitted contribute to growth in GSP and employment. Since
the coefficient for the GSP equation exceeds that in the employment equation, pro-
ductivity would also be expected to rise as predicted. Wage inflation is negatively
correlated with employment growth, as expected. By comparison, the adjusted unem-
ployment rate is positively correlated with both GSP and employment growth. While
the coefficients on adjusted unemployment are not significantly different from zero,
they are significantly different from the coefficients on the job loser unemployment
rate.16 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
LABOR MARKET EFFECTS
The second pair of simultaneous equations addresses the joint determination of
the job loser unemployment rates and wage inflation.
(14) JLUR = b0 + b1*UR–1 + b2*BEN–1 + b3*PUBUNION + b4*GSP–1 +
b5*WAGINF + b6*MANEMP + b7*EDUC + e ,
(15) WAGINF = a0 + a1*JLUR + a2*ADJUSTEDUR + e ,
where JLUR is the job loser unemployment rate; WAGINF is the rate of wage infla-
tion; UR is the unemployment rate; PUBUNION is the percent of public employees
who are union members; GSP is the GSP growth rate; BEN is a measure of unem-
ployment insurance generosity; MANEMP is the percentage of employment in the
manufacturing sector; EDUC is the percentage of college graduates; and ADJUSTEDUR
is the adjusted unemployment rate.5 Using the job loser unemployment rate as the
dependent variable captures the effects from the unemployment equation as incorpo-
rated through job loss.
As the generosity of unemployment insurance increases, the cost of shirking decreases.
On the labor supply side, the first-order conditions from Equation (2) indicate that an
increase in unemployment insurance benefits received, b, increases shirking. From
the firm’s perspective, the corporations in states where unemployment insurance is
generous must treat this as a form of employee compensation. Therefore, employers
are more likely to treat this generosity as a substitute form of compensation and
monitor workers in generous states; hence, the rate of workers fired, Q, rises. Since
fired employees are not eligible for unemployment insurance it suits firms to monitor
workers’ behavior.
Allen [1988] claims that public union members are less likely to lose their jobs
during economic downturns. Allen [1988] attributes the volatility of employment in
the private sector to the less sensitive occupations of public sector employees. Con-
trary to private unions, public sector unions tend to have positive employment effects.
In the presence of shirking, unionized public workers are less likely to be fired than
private sector and nonunion employees.
Another factor that influences a state’s job loser unemployment rate is GSP growth.
The tighter labor market affiliated with GSP growth causes the firm’s turnover cost,
(β + Q + r), to increase. Topel [1986] and Bartik [1991] find a negative relationship
between unemployment and GSP growth. As output and demand for labor increase,
firms are forced to accept some shirking to mitigate turnover costs.
Wage inflation is added to the unemployment equation as a feedback term and the
lagged unemployment rate is inserted as an exogenous indicator of labor market pres-
sure. The coefficient for the unemployment variable in the wage inflation equation
captures the Phillips relation [Hyclak and Johnes, 1992; Phillips, 1958]. An increase in
the job loser unemployment rate reduces wage pressure on employers. An increase in
adjusted unemployment also increases opportunities for employers to fill positions
and/or replace workers.
In terms of the theoretical model, shirking is reduced when firms monitor worker
performance and provide on-the-job training. Both of these conditions are prevalent in17 THE DETERMINANTS OF SHIRKING
the manufacturing sector. Therefore, shirking is more easily exposed and perhaps
less likely in the manufacturing sector. An increase in the percentage of manufactur-
ing employment would result in a reduction in shirking and a lower job loser unem-
ployment rate. Another interpretation of the empirical relationship between manu-
facturing employment and the job loser unemployment rate is that states that attract
manufacturing employment are expected to have lower unemployment and fewer job
losers. Likewise, a lower percentage of manufacturing jobs over time increases the
likelihood of job loser unemployment [Jacobson, 1987].
The consumer behavior model specifies that wages and benefits are a vital compo-
nent in the decision to shirk. Since education is linked to human capital and wage
increases, the opportunity cost of shirking increases with education [Kim and Kim,
2000; Tremblay, 1986]. Also, educated professionals work independently of their co-workers,
but more closely with customers; therefore, formal monitoring is less likely in profes-
sional occupations. In essence, the professional worker’s desire to maintain or enhance
his reputation is what guides him [Mintzberg, 1983]. With these considerations in
mind, educational attainment is expected to decrease shirking and the job loser unem-
ployment rate.
The estimations for Equations (14) and (15) are displayed in columns 1 and 2 of
Table 2. As shown in the wage inflation equation, column 2, the two component unem-
ployment rates have similar impacts. The negative correlation between unemploy-
ment and wage inflation is observed.
TABLE 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
JLUR WAGINF ADJUSTED WAGINF
Constant –0.075* 0.056* 0.028* 0.069*



















Absolute t-statistics in parentheses.
N = 432.
*     Significant at .01.
**   Significant at .05.
*** Significant at .10.18 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
The control variables behave as expected. LAGGSP is negatively correlated with
the unemployment rate. The public union variable is negatively correlated with job
losses, reflecting the heightened job security of public union workers. Benefits are
positively correlated with the job loser unemployment rate. This is an alternate form
of compensation that substitutes for tolerating shirking. EDUC reveals a significant
negative correlation with the unemployment rate, reinforcing the concept that the
opportunity cost for job loss is greater with a more educated work force. Similarly,
MANEMP is negatively correlated with job loss. This evidence is consistent with the
argument that manufacturing industries carry higher turnover costs and would, in
equilibrium, display less job loss from shirking.
The third pair of simultaneous equations addresses the joint determination of the
adjusted unemployment rates and wage inflation. Since our underlying analysis of
shirking suggests that differences may exist between the unemployment components,
the simultaneous estimation is repeated with the remaining unemployment rate as
the dependent variable.
(16) ADJUSTEDUR = b0 + b1*UR–1 + b2*GSP–1 + b3*BEN–1 +
b4*WAGINF + b5*MANEMP + b6*EDUC + e ,
(17) WAGINF = a0 + a1*JLUR + a2*ADJUSTEDUR + e ,
where ADJUSTEDUR is the adjusted unemployment rate; WAGINF is the rate of
wage inflation; UR is the unemployment rate; GSP is the GSP growth rate; BEN is a
measure of unemployment insurance generosity; MANEMP is the percentage of employ-
ment in the manufacturing sector; EDUC is the percentage of college graduates; and
JLUR is the job loser unemployment rate.
In Equation (15), JLUR and ADJUSTEDUR influence wage inflation and the simul-
taneous effects are captured through the job loser unemployment rate as an instru-
ment, while in Equation (17) these effects are captured through adjusted unemploy-
ment rate. If an increase in the job loser unemployment rate captures a decrease in
the provision of shirking as a form of on the job compensation, then we would expect
a positive correlation between the job loser unemployment rate and wage inflation.
However, the remaining unemployment rate would still be expected to reveal the
Phillip’s relationship.
Unemployment insurance increases the reservation wage of the job seeker and
encourages search unemployment [Moomaw, 1998; Meyer, 1990]. In spite of the ineli-
gibility of job leavers, new entrants, and fired workers for collecting unemployment
insurance, the increased duration of unemployment causes unemployment rates to be
higher in states where benefits are generous [Pantuosco and Parker, 1998].
The estimation of Equations (16) and (17) is shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.
When the unemployment rate for job losers is entered as an independent variable in
the wage inflation equation, it exhibits a positive correlation that is significantly dif-
ferent from that associated with the adjusted unemployment rate component. This is
consistent with the explanation of shirking and wages as substitute forms of compen-
sation. EDUC is again negative and significantly correlated with the unemployment
rate, as is MANEMP capturing the industry mix. For each of these variables the19 THE DETERMINANTS OF SHIRKING
coefficient is of a larger magnitude for the adjusted unemployment rate than for the
job loser unemployment rate. While the direction of the dynamics is the same, this
suggests a greater sensitivity for the adjusted unemployment rate than the job loser
rate to these influences.
The other control variables are consistent with the previous specification, with
the exception of benefits. Benefits are negatively correlated with adjusted unemploy-
ment rates. If benefits reflect state generosity, then more workers in a less generous
state would initiate search unemployment. This illustrates another empirical differ-
ence between the performance of the job loser unemployment rate and the adjusted
unemployment rate.
In summary, the labor market equations reveal the difference in the performance
of the job loser unemployment rate and the adjusted unemployment rate as they
relate to the business cycle. The cyclical link between unemployment and GSP is
present in the adjusted unemployment rate rather than the job loser rate. These
unemployment rates also differ in their relation to wage inflation and unemployment
benefits.
CONCLUSION
The extended Shapiro-Stiglitz model suggests that economic factors influence the
degree of shirking tolerated by the firm and attempted by the worker. Using the job
loser unemployment rate as a proxy for shirkers monitored and dismissed, a number
of correlations are revealed between economic conditions and shirking. Firms are
more apt to fire shirkers during downturns and tolerate shirking during expansions.
Shirking is greater in states where unemployment insurance benefits are generous.
Public union employment decreases job loss, regardless of shirking. The adjusted
unemployment rate exhibits the classic Phillips relation, while job loser unemploy-
ment reveals the substitutability between wage inflation and shirking. Both education
and industry mix influence shirking and job loss. The more educated the work force
and the greater the employment in manufacturing, the less shirking.
Even though the relationships have spurious components, the empirical analysis
of state data justifies expanding the Shapiro-Stiglitz model to allow a continuous level
of shirking. This expansion reveals dynamic changes in the tolerance of and willing-
ness to shirk.
APPENDIX
Definitions (All data are at the state level.)
1. UR: the annual unemployment rate.
2. JLUR: the job loser unemployment rate.
3. ADJUSTEDUR: adjusted unemployment rate is the UR – JLUR.
4. WAGINF: the annual percentage change in the wage.
5. PUBUN: the percentage of public workers who are in unions.
6. PROD: the annual percentage change in the ratio of GSP/employment.
7. GSP: the annual percentage change in the gross state product.20 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
8. CHPOP: the annual percentage change in the population.
9. EMP: the annual percentage change in the number of people employed.
10. BEN: the product of the replacement rate and the percent of the unemployed
receiving unemployment insurance.
11. All LAG variables are one-year lags of the respective variable.
12. MANEMP: is the percentage of the employed in the manufacturing sector.
13. EDUC: is the percentage of the population over 25 years old with a Bachelor’s
degree.
Data Sources
1. Data on employment and unemployment are taken from the U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2. Gross state product (GSP) data are from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Economic Analysis.
3. Union membership data are from the United States Statistical Abstracts and dis-
kettes from Hirsch and McPherson [1993] and Hirsch, McPherson, and DuMond
[1997].
4. Wage data are from the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training
Administration.
5. Educational attainment data are from U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 Census of
      Population, CPH-L-96, and Current Population Reports, P20-528.
6. Manufacturing employment data are provided by U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau
of  Labor Statistics.
NOTES
1. For a formal statement of the necessary conditions for the more general dynamic optimization
problem see Intrilligator [1971]. In general, the state variables are continuous function of time, the
control variables are piecewise continuous, and the control trajectory is then a piecewise continu-
ous vector value of time. Values for the control variables are constrained such that the control
vector belongs to a nonempty, closed, bounded, convex subset of Euclidean space.
2. Specifically, Table 21, Geographic Profiles of the Employed and Unemployed, Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
3. A chi-squared test was performed to estimate the difference between the impacts of the job loser
unemployment rate and the adjusted unemployment rate on state economic activity.
4. The subscripted –1 indicates that the variable is lagged one year.
5. BEN is the product of the replacement rate and the percent of the unemployed collecting unem-
ployment insurance.
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